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I. INTRODUCTION 
In an address to the House of Commons, Winston Churchill once 
said, “No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all-wise.  Indeed, it has 
been said that democracy is the worst form of Government except all those 
other forms that have been tried from time to time.”1 His words are just as 
true today as they were in 1947.  With negative television ads, smear 
campaigns, and politically motivated lawsuits, the state of American 
democracy may seam bleak.  Regardless of these unfortunate practices, one 
of democracy’s best attributes remains intact; it is a recursive system.  Even 
when democratic politics is at its most despicable levels, the people still 
possess the power to change the system and remove the offending party 
from office.  This too is applicable to partisan gerrymandering.2 If the 
practice is offensive to a majority of the voting population, new representa-
tives will be elected, notwithstanding the egregious shapes that are created 
by the gerrymandering process.3 Democracy’s recursive nature combined 
with our systems of federalism and separation of powers – both at the state 
and federal level – make gerrymandering for political purposes an intelli-
gent practice only if it is used to a point that is tolerable by voters. 
 The Supreme Court has had a difficult time in deciding how to han-
dle the issue of partisan gerrymandering, a legislative procedure practiced 
since our nation’s founding.  Oscillating in the past half century, they have 
 
1 CHAMBERS DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 265 No. 32 (Alison Jones ed., Chambers 
1997). 
2 Gerrymandering is a noun meaning “[t]he practice of dividing a geographical area 
into electoral districts, often of highly irregular shape, to give one political party an unfair 
advantage by diluting the opposition’s voting strength.”  Its etymology comes from the 
combination of Governor Elbridge “Gerry” and “salamander” after an election district 
created when Gerry was governor of Massachusetts. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 708-9 
(8th ed. 2004). 
3 The optimum shape for a district is a circle because it is the most compact of shapes.  
To determine how much a district is gerrymandered, an equation must be calculated to 
determine how much it deviates from a circle:  The area of the district is divided by pi, and 
then the square root of that quotient is found to determine what the radius of the district 
would be if it was a circle.  That radius is multiplied by 2 and pi to determine what this 
hypothetical circle’s circumference would be.  The district’s actual circumference is 
divided by the hypothetical circumference to find its deviation.  If this final quotient were 
1, it would be perfect, and as it increases above 1, it suggests more gerrymandering.  By 
running a district through a Geographic Information System program, its area and circum-
ference can be found, and then if the equation is performed, its gerrymandering quotient 
can be determined.  Two of the most gerrymandered districts are Florida’s 3rd District 
represented by Representative Corrine Brown (D) with a quotient of 4.59 and Georgia’s 
11th District represented by Representative Phil Gingrey (R) with a quotient of 5.34.  See 
infra Appendix pp. 1-2. 
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ruled non-racial gerrymandering as both nonjusticiable and justiciable, but 
never with an agreement to a standard of unconstitutionality.4 Lower courts 
have struggled to apply the Court’s confusing decisions pragmatically and 
have been forced to nearly always dismiss such cases,5 but debate continues 
as to whether courts should be addressing this issue at all.  Some argue that 
the Constitution expressly leaves congressional districting to the state 
legislatures and Congress, with absolutely no role for courts; while others 
claim judicial review and other legal and political developments allow 
courts to intervene in the redistricting process. 6 
At issue is the Elections Clause of the Constitution.7 Either this 
clause is a manifest declaration that redistricting is principled in federalism 
and separation of powers, foreclosing judicial activity, or the clause and 
subsequent constitutional amendments permit court action in the redistrict-
ing process.  The first theory leaves congressional districting to the elected 
branches of government as a nonjusticiable political question, while the 
second has several theories for a judicial role, such as First Amendment 
protections, Equal Protection rights, or Guarantee Clause requirements.8 It 
is clear that racial gerrymandering is both an Equal Protection Clause and a 
Fifteenth Amendment violation,9 but the constitutionality of districting 
based on political party identification remains in limbo.10 
When the Supreme Court decided The Texas Redistricting Cases, it 
only added to the confusion.11 While three justices held that the issue of 
justiciability was not to be revisited, two did not take a position on the issue 
 
4 Compare Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986) (holding political gerrymandering 
cases properly justiciable under the equal protection clause), with Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 
U.S. 267 (2004) (holding by plurality that political gerrymandering cases are nonjusticia-
ble). 
5 See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 280 nn.5-6 & 8. 
6 See infra Part II.B. 
7 The Elections Clause reads, “The Times, Places, and Manner of holding Elections for 
Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; 
but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the 
Places of chusing [sic] Senators.”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. 
8 Guarantee Clause challenges to redistricting plans have consistently been held non-
justiciable political questions; therefore this Note will not offer this argument for dispute.  
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); see also Luther v. Borden 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849) 
(refusing to hear case where legitimacy of the Rhode Island government was challenged 
under the Guarantee Clause).  See generally U.S. CONST. art IV, § 4. 
9 See Reynolds v. Sims, 379 U.S. 870 (1964); City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 
(1980). 
10 While this Note contends that all districting schemes are nonjusticiable political 
questions, the focus of the discussion will be on congressional districting schemes because 
the Elections Clause in the Constitution specifically governs these. 
11 League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry (The Texas Redistricting Cases), 
126 S. Ct. 2594 (2006). 
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because they claimed it had not been argued, two stated explicitly that it 
was justiciable, and two held that it was not.12 This was a missed opportu-
nity to resolve an important question in American politics and law, and the 
Court should have held that non-racial gerrymandering is a “political 
question.”13 While the holding was correct, the plurality opinion with its 
multiple concurrences and dissents produce no clear guidance for future 
cases; strictly applying a standard that political gerrymandering cases are 
nonjusticiable is a better standard. 
 Part II will provide the background on the practice of political ger-
rymandering.  It will explain its history and development, state arguments 
for and against it, and suggest what role is proper for courts in this area.  
Part III describes the Elections Clause; including its formation during the 
Constitutional Convention, its implementation by the state legislatures and 
Congress, and its interpretation by the U.S. Supreme Court.  After analyzing 
the relationship between the Elections Clause and the practice of gerryman-
dering by state legislatures (and regulation thereof by Congress) throughout 
American political history, a clearer baseline for proper judicial involve-
ment should become more evident.  Part IV will explain an exception to the 
Election Clause’s default position that requires court action in gerrymander-
ing, i.e. racial motivations in districting.  Part V demonstrates that although 
the Fourteenth and the Fifteenth Amendments require court supervision of 
racial gerrymandering, this is not comparable to purely political gerryman-
dering.  The Court ignored its prior rulings on this issue when it began 
adjudicating partisan gerrymandering claims, ignoring the default position 
of the Elections Clause.  A lack of any proper judicial role is further shown 
by the Court’s inability to adequately articulate a manageable standard to 
adjudicate the perceived problem, which is required to exclude such issues 
from being qualified as a political question.14 Part VI is an analysis of The 
Texas Redistricting Cases, in which the Court provided no further guidance 
to state legislatures, Congress, or lower courts on how to handle the issue of 
political gerrymandering.  The flaws of its reasoning will be demonstrated 
along with examples of why judicial involvement is unnecessary.  Part VII 
forecasts the effects of The Texas Redistricting Cases on state legislatures, 
and suggests ways those bodies, Congress, and lower courts can mitigate 
the holding of the case. 
 
12 Id. 
13 Something is a political question, and therefore nonjusticiable, if it meets any of the 
following descriptions: the Constitution’s text commits the issue to another governmental 
branch, a judicially discernable standard does not exist, a nonjudicial policy determination 
must be made, a decision would be disrespectful to another branch, finality is needed to an 
already made political decision, embarrassment could result from conflicting pronounce-
ments.  Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. 
14 Id. 
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II. POLITICAL GERRYMANDERING 
A.  Historical Perspective of Political Gerrymandering 
 
The practice of politicians creating their own legislative districts and 
attempting to influence the outcomes of elections with their designs has a 
long history in American politics.15 Brought as a practice from England, 
colonial politicians were familiar with the importance of shaping districts 
for electoral advantage, i.e. gerrymandering.  The phrase gerrymander was 
first coined in 1812, but the development of the practice in America began 
well over 100 years before.16 The first known appearance of gerrymandered 
districts was in Pennsylvania during the formation of its colonial assembly 
districts in 1705.  The city of Philadelphia was artificially excluded from 
Philadelphia County to weaken the former’s political influence, thus 
creating the most prominent of colonial gerrymanders.17 
After the Revolution, gerrymandering continued.  One famous re-
ported case (albeit disputed) is that of the attempt by Patrick Henry and his 
fellow Anti-Federalist’s “unceasing efforts” to insure James Madison was 
defeated in his election to the First Congress in 1788.18 Madison prevailed 
in his congressional election, but by then the Founders were well versed in 
gerrymandering, and “Washington, Madison, and Jefferson were not 
unacquainted with the possible results of a partisan districting law.”19 
Partisanship reached a climax by 1812, the year the term “gerrymander” 
came into existence,20 and by that year, there had been twelve cases of 
attempted or successful gerrymandered districting plans, nine of which 
involved congressional districts.21 
The “Era of Good Feeling” followed the War of 1812, and partisan-
ship was less intense, and gerrymandering became less frequent.22 But, as 
cycles in American politics occur, after several decades the practice re-
sumed.  As one scholar puts it, “By 1840 the gerrymander was a recognized 
force in party politics and was generally attempted in all legislation enacted 
for the formulation of election districts.  It was generally conceded that each 
 
15 ELMER C. GRIFFITH, THE RISE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE GERRYMANDER (Chicago:  
Scott, Foresman and Company 1907). 
16 Id. at 26-28. 
17 Id. at 120. 
18 2 WILLIAM C. RIVES, HISTORY OF THE LIFE AND TIMES OF JAMES MADISON 653-56 
(Books for Libraries Press 1970) (1868). 
19 GRIFFITH, supra note 15, at 122. 
20 Id. at 122, 16-17. 
21 Id. at 121, 5-6. 
22 Id. at 123. 
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party would attempt to gain power which was not proportionate to its 
numerical strength.”23 The first attempt to have an apportionment plan 
declared unconstitutional was unsuccessful, as the issue was held nonjusti-
ciable.24 Not until a later interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment in 
Baker v. Carr were any arguments successful that redistricting was not a 
political question and thus justiciable.25 
Technology may make gerrymandering more exact, and today’s 
climate of intense partisanship may make gerrymandering more intense, but 
the practice is as old as our country.  There are times it occurs less fre-
quently or abashedly, but gerrymandering is characteristic of American 
politics.  In fact the Supreme Court has stated, “Politics and political 
considerations are inseparable from districting and apportionment.”26 
B.  Arguments For and Against Political Gerrymandering 
 
Passionate arguments are raised by pundits and scholars alike to the 
appropriateness of judicial action to curb partisan gerrymandering.  Critics 
of political gerrymandering claim that the practice undermines and weakens 
our democracy or republican form of government, so therefore it is neces-
sary for courts to intervene in the redistricting process.27 They contend that 
partisan gerrymandering can crystallize the democratic process to such an 
extreme that elections become moot.28 While those who disagree with the 
justiciability of the issue argue that courts are ill equipped to handle the 
political complexities of these cases.29 To them, it is always more appropri-
ate for the “elected branches” to have the sole authority in redistricting.30 
C.  The Proper Role of Courts in Congressional Redistricting 
 
Regardless of the inherent evils of purely partisan-motivated gerry-
mandering and the arguments for judicial intervention, the Constitution 
clearly states that the default position for authority on congressional redis-
tricting is the Elections Clause.  It is textually demonstrative that state 
 
23 Id. 
24 Colgrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946). 
25 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
26 Gaffney v. Cummings. 412 U.S. 735, 753 (1973) (opinion by White, J.). 
27 E.g., Jamal Greene, Judging Partisan Gerrymanders Under The Elections Clause,
114 YALE L.J. 1021 (2005); 
28 E.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Judging Politics:  The Elusive Quest for Judicial Review of 
Political Fairness, 71 Tex. L. REV. 1643 (1993). 
29 E.g., Nathaniel Persily, In Defense of Foxes Guarding Henhouses:  The Case for 
Judicial Acquiescence, 116 HARV. L. REV. 649 (2002). 
30 E.g., Editorial, DeLay’s Revenge, WALL ST. J., June 29, 2006, at A14. 
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legislatures and Congress have jurisdiction over this process.  Unless the 
Constitution has been amended in this aspect, courts have no role in this 
political process, and the test annunciated in Baker v. Carr – if applied 
properly – only reinforces this conclusion.  The Framers of the Constitution 
were clear that the entity with the ultimate say of how candidates were 
elected to Congress was Congress, not the legislatures, nor the president or 
governors, and certainly not the courts. 
 Beyond the Constitution’s textually demonstrable indication that 
Congress is to govern congressional districting, the Court has been unable 
to articulate a standard by which partisan districting can be found unconsti-
tutional, and judicial involvement is nevertheless unnecessary.  Politics in 
America is cyclical, and electoral paradigms shift and evolve to influence 
the effects of congressional districting.31 Furthermore, after three attempts 
at resolving the issue, the disagreement between the Supreme Court justices 
has prevented any clarity and caused nothing but confusion.32 Because of 
the Constitution’s textual direction, the lack of any agreeable legal standard, 
and judicial involvement being unneeded, the proper role for courts in 
partisan gerrymandering is abstention. 
 
III. THE ELECTIONS CLAUSE: PROVIDING FEDERAL ELECTION LAW’S
DEFAULT 
During colonization, it was settled law in England that Parliament 
was the ultimate and sole authority in determining the methods in which its 
members were elected.  Blackstone summarized this fact succinctly when 
he said, “ It will be sufficient to observe, that the whole law of and custom 
of parliament has its original from this one maxim, that whatever matter 
arises concerning either house of parliament, ought to be examined, dis-
cussed, and adjudged in that house to which it relates, and not elsewhere.”33 
This concept would become the model for how Congress would be regu-
lated under the U.S. Constitution. 
 
31 Since the Depression, there have been two instances where redistricting took a “full 
circle” in the states, eleven instances where redistricting took a “half circle” in the states, 
and sixteen instances where redistricting produced “conflicted results” in the states.  This is 
measured only at reapportionment and the succeeding congressional election for states with 
more than one representative.  See infra Appendix p.3. 
32 “Justice Kennedy’s discussion of appellants’ political-gerrymandering claims ably 
demonstrates that, yet again, no party or judge has put forth a judicially discernable 
standard by which to evaluate them (citation omitted)…. Instead, we again dispose of this 
claim in a way that provides no guidance to lower-court judges and perpetuates a cause of 
action with no discernable content.”  The Texas Redistricting Cases, 126 S. Ct. 2594, at 
2663 (2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
33 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *163 (internal quotation omitted). 
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A.  The Framers’ Intent 
 
The United States’ first attempt at government formation came in 
1781’s Articles of Confederation.  In the spirit of the Articles as a whole, 
the process of choosing members of Congress was left entirely up to state 
legislatures, which was archetypical of the Articles’ failure to provide an 
adequate system of federal governance.  In nearly all aspects of the confed-
eration of the former colonies, including choosing members for the national 
legislature, states essentially retained their “sovereignty, freedom and 
independence” and no action could be taken unless nine states assented.34 
Because of the underlying premise of state sovereignty guaranteed 
in the Articles, state legislatures were free to select any method of appoint-
ing delegates to the Congress and were able to recall them or replace them 
at any time.35 The only restrictions placed on the selection of delegates was 
a basic set of term limits and a prohibition of a member from receiving 
compensation from the national government.36 Article V made it explicit 
that the states were solely responsible for maintaining their delegates.37 
By 1787, it was clear that the Articles of Confederation was a failure 
and a new agreement between the states was necessary.  Many issues were 
debated during the Constitutional Convention that summer in Philadelphia, 
and the method of choosing members of Congress was one of them.  The 
Committee of Details’ first draft of the Constitution mentioned what would 
become the Elections Clause, but without any mention of who would have 
the ultimate authority over the electoral process.38 Many minor alterations 
would occur, with the committee eventually recommending that the time, 
place, and manner of elections to each house would be controlled by state 
legislatures, but Congress could alter those.39 
On August 9, the full convention took up the article for debate and 
possible amending, which produced what is essentially Article I § 4 of the 
U.S. Constitution.  An attempt was made to make the article applicable only 
to the House of Representatives, but this failed by a ten to one vote, and the 
word “respectively” was added after “State,”40 but the Committee of Style 
would later change “respectively” to “thereof.”41 The most contentious 
 
34 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. II; id. art. IX, cl. 6. 
35 Id. art. V, cl. 1. 
36 Id. art. V, cl. 2. 
37 Id. art. V, cl. 3. 
38 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 135 (Max Farrand ed., 
Yale University Press 1937) [hereinafter FARRAND’S]. 
39 2 id. at 155. 
40 2 id. at 229. 
41 2 id. at 592. 
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debate was over an amendment offered by John Rutledge and Charles 
Pinckney to strike “be altered by Congress” so as to make the state legisla-
tures and not Congress the ultimate authority – essentially a debate over 
federalism.42 The two South Carolinians were content with the freedom of 
selection mandated by the Articles of Confederation, but that document’s 
failures were the impetus for a stronger national government.   
 Proponents of Congress being the definitive authority over federal 
election law made several arguments for the rejection of the Rutledge-
Pinckney amendment.  Mr. Ghorum of Massachusetts argued that the 
amendment would be akin to giving the counties of England authority in the 
selection of members of Parliament.  James Madison made it clear that not 
giving Congress the ability to control the selection process could lead to 
abuses by state legislatures, depriving “the people” with proper representa-
tion in the national government.  While Mr. Morris of Pennsylvania, having 
more faith in the state governments, suggested elections could be uninten-
tionally certified incorrectly, with no remedy available to the Congress.43 
The Rutledge-Pinckney amendment was rejected, and afterwards the 
delegates gave Congress additionally authority by allowing it to not only 
alter, but also make regulations if state legislatures should refuse or fail to 
do so completely.44 An exception was added to the clause providing that 
the place of choosing Senators remained under the sole authority of the 
legislatures.  The section was then agreed to, and the convention adjourned 
for the day at 11:00 that morning.45 It is clear from the day’s discussions 
that the Framers wanted Congress to have ultimate authority in deciding its 
membership selection process.  Although the principle was grounded in 
federalism, the concept of judicial activity in the process – a separation of 
powers concept – would have been even more foreign to the Framers and 
rejected as the Rutledge-Pinckney amendment was.46 
B.  Congressional Acts 
 
Congress has taken little action in response to its ability to amend or 
 
42 2 id. at 240. 
43 2 id. at 240-42.  The English laws requiring Parliament to control its own elections 
supports Mr. Ghorum’s analogy.  WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *177 (“[The 
method of elections] is also regulated by the law of parliament….”). 
44 2 FARRAND’S, supra note 36 at 242. 
45 2 id. at 613; 2 id. at 229. 
46 As the ratification of the Constitution was being debated in the state legislatures, the 
federalism argument made by Rutledge and Pinckney continued, but the Founders were 
confident and insistent that the Elections Clause was correct in providing Congress as the 
ultimate authority in this area of the law.  THE FEDERALIST NOS. 59, 60, 61 (Alexander 
Hamilton). 
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supersede state legislative redistricting policies, suggesting a faith in the 
propriety of state legislative action.  The first federal legislation enacted 
under this authority was passed in 1842 and simply required representatives 
to be elected in districts.47 Although this requirement was deleted from the 
1850 Apportionment Act (allowing at-large elections), it was included in 
the 1862 statute. 48 Additional requirements for congressional districts - 
contiguity, compactness, and substantial population equality - were added to 
later apportionment acts, but all the requirements for congressional districts 
were absent from the law passed in 1929.   Only in 1967 was the single-
member district requirement restored by Congress, which is the current 2 
U.S.C. § 2c.49 
Congressional restraint from directing state legislatures on the proc-
ess of choosing members for the House of Representatives demonstrates 
their belief that the fomer bodies are fully capable of establishing a fair and 
democratic procedure.  Only eight acts of Congress have established or 
amended the requirements for procedures, and one of those permitted three 
requirements - contiguity, compactness, and substantial population equality 
- to expire.50 It appears that Congress’s only mandate for congressional 
districts is that they exist, forbidding states from electing their representa-
tives at-large.51 Besides the one requirement, state legislatures are freed by 
Congress to conceive of the other details in which redistricting takes place.  
Since the Elections Clause is a default provision, if Congress does not act 
under the clause, state law is supreme.52 
State legislatures immediately utilized their initial authority to regu-
late the selection of congressional members, and many did so by 
implementing congressional districts within their states.53 It is obvious that 
legislatures believed they possessed such power because of the Elections 
Clause, and the only other authority that allowed such actions was the 
tradition of districting for their own legislative bodies.  It is evident that the 
Elections Clause provides such authority as its wording provides legisla-
 
47 Apportionment Act of 1842, ch. 47, § 2, 5 Stat. 491 (repealed 1850). 
48 THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ANALYSIS AND INTERPRE-
TATION 117-21 (Johnny H. Killian & George A. Costello eds., U.S. Government Printing 
Office 1996) [hereinafter CONSTITUTION ANALYSIS]; see also 2 U.S.C.A. §§ 2-3 (2000). 
49 2 U.S.C.A. § 2c (2000). 
50 See Wood v. Broom, 387 U.S. 1 (1932). 
51 Act of December 14, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-196, 81 Stat. 581 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 
2c (2000)). 
52 Foster v. Love, 522 U.S. 67, 69 (1997). 
53 KENNETH C. MARTIS, THE HISTORICAL ATLAS OF POLITICAL PARTIES 1789-1989 at 
70 (Macmillan Publishing Company 1989) (showing at the 1st Congress there were 11 
states that had more than one representative, and seven of those elected their members in 
districts.  Only Connecticut, New Hampshire, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania had at-large 
elections for multiple members). 
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tures access to all facets of electing members to the U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives.54 
C.  Judicial Gloss 
 
The Supreme Court has provided few cases to determine its juris-
prudence of the Elections Clause.  Even fewer are applicable to the question 
of the justiciability of political gerrymandering cases, as it took the Court 
until 1879 to determine that Congress’s regulations did indeed supersede 
state legislative actions when they were inconsistent - as the Framers 
intended.55 The Court later explained that Congress could restrict state 
power by exercising its authority under the Elections Clause, although it has 
infrequently done so.56 In essence, Congress can supplement state regula-
tions or substitute its own, and has “supervisory power over the whole 
subject.”57 
The Court’s first detailed examination of Elections Clause parame-
ters was a challenge to an Illinois apportionment plan that lacked substantial 
equality of population amongst its districts.58 It was clearly recognized that 
redistricting is embroiled in politics, and it would be improper for the 
judiciary to compel the legislative bodies to act in regards to these processes 
either through injunction or mandamus.59 Although the appellants raised 
legitimate concerns of public harms, the Court made clear that by direction 
of the Constitution, such issues had to be remedied elsewhere.60 
Furthermore, the judiciary has consistently held that Congress is su-
preme to state legislatures under the Elections Clause, and state 
governments cannot overstep congressional or constitutional mandates.  
Twice in the past two decades the Court has held state legislative actions 
unconstitutional regardless of claimed Elections Clause authority premised 
 
54 The words “Times, Places, and Manner” answer the questions of “when,” “where,” 
and “how.”  All that is left to be answered is “who,” “what,” and “why.”  “What” is 
obviously voting, “why” is unanswerable, and “who” is covered by other sections of the 
Constitution.  The Framers choice of words in the Elections Clause suggests they intended 
it to cover most aspects electoral regulation.  U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 4, cl. 1. 
55 Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 383-86 (1879).  Contra H.R REP. NO. 28-60 (1st 
Sess. 1843) (recommending legislation be passed stating section 2 of the 1842 Apportion-
ment Act requiring single-member districts is unconstitutional since several states had 
previously passed laws creating at-large elections for their members to the U.S. House of 
Representatives). 
56 United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 315 (1940); see also supra Part III.B. 
57 Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 367 (1932) (quoting Siebold, 100 U.S. at 387) (em-
phasis added). 
58 Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1945). 
59 Id. at 544-55. 
60 Id. 
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on a lack of congressional actions.  In Cook v. Gralike, the Court held that 
state legislatures do not have the power under the Elections Clause to 
require certain designations be placed beside the names of candidates.  
Actions such are these are violations of the Qualifications Clause and the 
First Amendment.61 These cases did not involve the issue of justiciability 
of partisan gerrymandering cases, but held that state action can be held to 
constitutional scrutiny even if the state claims its authority is derived from 
the clause.  States cannot cloak themselves from judicial intervention by 
describing an action as a regulation of “Times, Places and Manner of 
holding Elections for Senators and Representatives.”62 If a legislative 
action is truly such a regulation, such as redistricting, it is a wholly separate 
matter. 
 Clearly, the pre-Civil War Elections Clause jurisprudence formu-
lated congressional supremacy as to the regulation of the procedures in 
which U.S. representatives were chosen.  At that time, state legislatures had 
default authority, Congress had overriding or supplemental authority, and 
judicial action was totally foreclosed.  The process of redistricting was 
governed solely by the two former institutions. 
 
IV. THE CIVIL WAR AMENDMENTS: PROVIDING EXCEPTIONS TO THE ELEC-
TIONS CLAUSE 
At the end of the Civil War, the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fif-
teenth Amendments were added to the Constitution to help remedy the 
blight of slavery from American democracy.  These would provide the 
Supreme Court with the ability to interject itself into some aspects of the 
politics of redistricting, as was previously disallowed.  Although judicial 
foreclosure in redistricting remains the constitutional default position, the 
entrenched inequities of racial discrimination provided exceptions. 
 
A.  The Equal Protection Clause 
 
The Supreme Court took nearly 100 years before it entered the ger-
rymandering foray; first establishing the premise of one-person, one-vote to 
counter the practice of state legislatures diluting the voting power of minori-
ties.  The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment permitted 
this necessary action, without which the default position of the Elections 
 
61 531 U.S. 510 (2001); see also U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995) 
(holding that a state law forbidding its members of the U.S. House of Representatives to 
serve more than a certain number of terms was a violation of U.S. CONST. art I, § 2, cl. 2, 
known as the “Qualifications Clause”). 
62 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. 
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Clause would have disallowed it. 
 In Baker v. Carr, the Court first announced that it had accepted the 
constitutional invitation to decide the propriety of districting schemes, 
previously holding that malapportionment challenges were a nonjusticiable 
political question.63 The one-person, one-vote doctrine soon emerged from 
which the Court explained that, 
 
Once the geographical unit for which a representative is to be chosen is designated, 
all who participate in the election are to have an equal vote – whatever their race, 
whatever their sex, wherever their occupation, whatever their income, and whatever 
their home may be in that geographical unit.  This is required by the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.64 
The requirement was extended to both houses of state legislatures in 
Reynolds v. Sims, which held that the Alabama state senate’s apportionment 
was an Equal Protection violation in those districts.65 The analogy to the 
U.S. Senate was inadequate to allow unequal populations in any districts.  
More importantly, Chief Justice Warren demonstrated that the need for 
judicial action to implement equal population in districts was a result of 
vote dilution of minority voters and the lack of any other available rem-
edy.66 This injustice affected a protected class, i.e. race, and judicial action 
through strict scrutiny was the only means to end it.67 
Congressional districts were placed under the one-person, one-vote 
requirement in Wesberry v. Sanders; marking the first time the judiciary 
directly inserted itself into what was previously a Congress/state legislature 
controlled field because of the Elections Clause.68 Relying more on Article 
I § 2 of the Constitution as opposed to the Fourteenth Amendment, the 
Court explained that the House of Representative’s creation was premised 
on equal voting strength. But, the Equal Protection Clause was the impetus 
for applying the principle to elections for the United States House of 
 
63 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
64 Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963) (applying the doctrine to the Georgia Assem-
bly). 
65 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
66 Id. at 568 (“The Equal Protection Clause demands no less than substantially equal 
state legislative representation for all citizens, of all places as well as all races”); id. at 586-
87 ([T]he action taken by the District Court in this case… was an appropriate and well-
considered exercise of judicial power”). 
67 Partisan gerrymandering, as compared to racial gerrymandering, is also a historical 
practice, but other remedies exist to correct it; such as participating in primaries, working 
on campaigns, lobbying legislatures, and gubernatorial vetoes.  Furthermore, party 
identification has never been held as a protected class and is a characteristic that changes 
amongst individuals. 
68 376 U.S. 1 (1964). 
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Representatives, even if it was not the Wesberry Court’s foundation.69 
There is no doubt that the clause could have been used to decide the case 
accordingly, but Article I § 2 provided a more “originalist” argument.70 
These reapportionment decisions were controversial in the 1960s, 
but they have become an established part of American democracy.71 The 
judiciary acted to create a more representative democracy and prevented 
further acts of racial discrimination in the political process.  Racial minori-
ties would have been unable to fully participate in elections without this 
action, which was permitted by the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment 
with its Equal Protection Clause.  Elected official were unlikely to correct 
the mistakes of malapportionment practices themselves, as it would have 
decreased their chances for reelection, creating a crystallization that is 
dissimilar to the effects of political gerrymandering.72 
B.  The Fifteenth Amendment 
 
In addition to the requirement that districts be equal in population, 
Congress and the Supreme Court have used the Fifteenth Amendment’s 
mandate that voting rights cannot be abridged “on account of race, color, or 
previous condition of servitude” to scrutinize districting plans and prevent 
racial gerrymandering.73 Gerrymandering is typically accomplished by 
“cracking,” “packing,” and “stacking” voting populations to reduce a 
segment of the population’s overall electoral success.74 This process has 
 
69 Id. at 18-19 (“[Justice] Harlan has clearly demonstrated that both the historical 
background and language preclude a finding that Art. 1, § 2, lays down the ipse dixit ‘one 
person, one vote’ in congressional elections….I would examine the Georgia congressional 
districts against the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”) (Clark, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
70 Since this section of the Constitution was passed at the same time as the Elections 
Clause, it is arguable that it can inherently restrict it by requiring equal population in 
congressional districts.  Cf. Mahan v. Powell, 410 U.S. 315 (1973) (holding that a dichot-
omy exists between legislative districting and congressional districting, as the former has 
more latitude for population differences as compared to the latter, which is premised on 
U.S. CONST. art. 1 § 2). 
71 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 833 (Aspen Law & Business 2001). 
72 See supra note 31. 
73 The Fifteenth Amendment reads “The right of citizens of he United States to vote 
shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, 
color, or previous condition of servitude.”  U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1. 
74 Cracking is separating and dispersing a concentrated group up into several districts 
to deny that group a majority in any of the districts.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 395 (8th 
ed. 2004).  Packing is concentrating a minority group into a minimum number of districts 
as a supermajority in those districts to limit their overall electoral influence.  Id. at 1140.  
Stacking is combining a large group into a district with a larger opposition group.  Id. at 
1440. 
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consistently been used for partisan purposes, but the Fifteenth Amendment 
prevents such techniques with racial motivations. 
 Since the ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment, Congress has 
been the predominant force in enforcing its provisions, and the Supreme 
Court has not used it to invalidate a legislative apportionment plan.75 It was 
during Reconstruction when Congress began enacting legislation under the 
amendment in order to bring former slaves into American politics as full 
participants.  Several acts were passed during this era to make interference 
in elections a federal offense,76 but the Supreme Court limited these provi-
sions to federal elections.77 The laws relating to election protections under 
the Fifteenth Amendment were eventually repealed once Reconstruction 
ended, leaving no enforcement provisions in place.78 
In the 20th Century, both Congress and the Court have reestablished 
principles to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment and its mandate against 
racial gerrymandering.  Laws were passed in 1957, 1960, 1964, 1965, 1968, 
1970, 1975, 1980, and 1982 to prevent discrimination on account of race in 
all aspects of voting, including districting plans.79 In Gomillion v. 
Lightfoot, the Supreme Court held that legislative redistricting plans could 
be a violation of the Fifteenth Amendment regardless of congressional 
actions.80 Coming just prior to the formation of the one-person, one-vote 
principle, the Court realized judicial action was not only permissible, but 
also required to prevent racial discrimination from hindering minority-
voting rights through reapportionment plans.  These state actions were 
beyond the “political” arena and could be litigated.81 
To rule that a plan is unconstitutional is difficult, as a violation only 
 
75 Paige v. Gray, 437 F. Supp. 137, 148 (M. Ga. 1977) (citing Beer v. United States, 
425 U.S. 130, 142 (1975) (holding city plan violative of the Fifteenth Amendment)) 
(explaining that most cases dealing with racial redistricting plans are scrutinized under the 
Fourteenth Amendment). 
76 The Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140 (repealed 1894) (providing for 
enforcement to protect the right to vote in federal elections); see also CONSTITUTION 
ANALYSIS, supra note 47, at 119. 
77 Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884) (holding laws relating to federal elections 
are proper under the fifteenth amendment and the elections clause); see also United States 
v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1876) (holing Congress went beyond the fifteenth amendment’s 
scope in passing legislation relating to all elections). 
78 Act of February 8, 1894, ch. 25, 28 Stat. 36-37 (repealing all statutes relating to su-
pervisors of elections). 
79 CONSTITUTION ANALYSIS, supra note 37, at 119 n.332; cf. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971 to 
1973ee-6 (2000) (codifying all federal voting rights laws).  See also Fannie Lou Hamer, 
Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and Amendments 
Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, 120 Stat. 577 (renewing the Voting Rights Act in 2006 
for another 25 years). 
80 364 U.S. 339 (1960). 
81 Id. at 347. 
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occurs if the challenged scheme was designed to suppress minority voting 
strength, and refusing to maximize minority voting strength is not re-
quired.82 Proportionality of electoral results is not guaranteed by the 
Constitution even for protected classes such as racial minorities.83 Thus, 
districting plans can be a violation of the Fifteenth Amendment, but it is 
difficult to prove a breach, and the U.S. Supreme Court has never found 
one. 
 Because of the pattern of racial discrimination in American politics, 
the Supreme Court has found an exception to the Election Clause’s default 
mandate.  Judicial action can be taken to ensure that districts have equal 
population and race is not used as a factor in diluting voting strength.  The 
Equal Protection Clause and the Fifteenth Amendment permit court inter-
vention, and the Congress has expanded those protections by enacting the 
Voting Rights Act.84 Without these constitutional invitations, court action 
would be foreclosed, and the Elections Clause directive that redistricting is 
a congressional and state legislative political decision would be absolute.85 
Slavery and racism required the exception to be established, but extreme 
partisan politics is incomparable to these injustices. 
 
V. IGNORING THE ELECTIONS CLAUSE’S DEFAULT WITHOUT A PROPER 
EXCEPTION 
Prior to 1986, the Court had always considered non-racial gerry-
mandering a nonjusticiable political question.  It made this explicitly clear 
in Colegrove v. Green, which was premised on the Elections Clause giving 
Congress supreme authority over congressional districting.86 Recognizing 
the Founders’ desire that Congress control congressional membership 
procedures, the Court explained, 
 
The short of it is that the Constitution has conferred upon Congress exclusive au-
thority to secure fair representation by the States in the popular House and left to 
 
82 Johnson v. DeGrandy, 512 U.S. 997 (1994); cf. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 
49-51 (describing the elements needed to establish a prima facie case of racially motivated 
vote dilution).  Compare City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980) (holding that a 
discriminatory purpose must be proven to strike down a legislative districting plan) with 42 
U.S.C.A. § 1973 (2003) (originally enacted as Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, 
Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131) (requiring only a discriminatory effect must be shown). 
83 Johnson, 512 U.S. at 1017-21. 
84 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Introduction to Federal Voting Rights Laws, 
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/intro/intro.htm (last visited July 6, 2006); Jennifer 
Yachnin, et al., Morning Business, ROLL CALL (Wash., D.C.), July 20, 2006, at 3. 
85 But see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 (making the U.S. of House of Representatives fall 
within a stricter bound of the one-person, one-vote doctrine). 
86 328 U.S. 549 (1946). 
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that House determination whether States have fulfilled their responsibility.  If Con-
gress failed in exercising its powers, whereby standards of fairness are offended, the 
remedy ultimately lies with the people. Whether Congress faithfully discharges its 
duty or not, the subject has been committed to the exclusive control of Congress.  
An aspect of government from which the judiciary, in view of what is involved, has 
been excluded by the clear intention of the Constitution cannot be entered by the 
federal courts because Congress may have been in default in exacting from States 
obedience to its mandate.87 
In Davis v. Bandemer, the Court reversed its position and decided 
that a purely partisan gerrymandering claim was justiciable, although it 
claimed to have decided the issue previously in Gaffney v. Cummings.88 Its 
decision, that political gerrymandering cases were justiciable, was premised 
on a weak inference and a poor application of the Baker test.  The decision 
provided lackluster justifications for this judicial insertion into what was 
previously a purely political question, and ignored the stare decisis of 
Colegrove v. Green. Furthermore, it created the confusion that was uncor-
rected in The Texas Redistricting Cases.
Justice White’s first reason for deciding justiciability for these types 
of cases is because he mentioned partisanship in an equal protection claim 
in his opinion in Gaffney.89 That case did involve a politically motivated 
gerrymander, but the justiciability issue was not directly addressed.  The 
claim was premised on a one-person, one-vote argument, and the case was 
decided on that issue.  Though equality of population was established to end 
racially motivated districting, and it was logical to extend it to all situations, 
it was incorrect to assume that this makes political gerrymandering justicia-
ble.  It begs the question to base the decision of Bandemer on this logic, and 
doings so is equivalent to deciding a case without adjudicating an underly-
ing issue, and then saying the issue is resolved because the case was 
decided. 
 The other rationale used by Justice White for holding that political 
gerrymandering cases are justiciable was a weak and results driven applica-
tion of the Baker test.  He parallels political gerrymandering to racial 
gerrymandering, basing the former’s justiciability on the latter’s, without 
recognizing any manifest differences between the two. 90 Explaining how 
party identification, i.e. being a Democrat, Republican, or other party 
member, is a protected class in a way similar to race is not mentioned in the 
opinion.  He recognizes that party identification is not immutable and has 
 
87 Id. at 544. 
88 Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986). 
89 Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973) (adjudicating a bipartisan, incumbent 
protection gerrymander that had less than perfect population equality in districts). 
90 Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 119.  But see supra Part IV.B.5 (explaining the historical bias 
against racial minorities and their classification as a protected class). 
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not been subject to the same historical stigma that race has, but the similari-
ties of the two to require justiciability are absent from the his discussion.91 
It is true that Baker was an apportionment case, and that the one-
person, one-vote rule did not arise until a few years later, but the Court then 
(and now) has been unable to formulate a “judicially discernible and 
manageable standard” for partisan gerrymandering.92 The forecasts for such 
a standard by Justice White have failed to come to fruition.  Furthermore, 
the requirement of fair representation as required by the one-person, one-
vote standard is not comparable to what is referred to as “adequacy of 
representation.”93 It appears that Justice White believes that having a 
voter’s chance of casting a winning vote as a member of a party is somehow 
as constitutionally necessary as a individual’s vote being counted equally.  
To the contrary, the Equal Protection Clause does not require proportional 
representation, but this is the logical extension of having “the same chance 
to elect representatives of [a political group’s] choice as any other political 
group.”94 
Bandemer failed to justify partisan gerrymandering’s justiciability 
beyond Gaffney’s cursory involvement on the issue and a lax Baker test, but 
after Bandemer the floodgates were opened to similar claims.  During this 
time, the “post-Bandemer/pre-Vieth era,” lower courts used Bandemer’s 
opinion to adjudicate partisan gerrymandering claims, and all but once 
ruling against judicial intervention.95 The 18 years of attempted application 
of the standard produced only clarity in its error.  As one scholar has 
explained, “Bandemer has served almost exclusively as an invitation to 
litigation without much prospect of redress.”96 
In 2003, the Court revisited the issue of partisan gerrymandering’s 
justiciability and ruled in a plurality opinion by Justice Scalia that these 
case were political questions.97 The holding was premised predominantly 
on a lack of a discernible standard to decide these questions.  Justice Scalia 
explained that the presence of an unconstitutional intent to use race in 
 
91 Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 119.  See also Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 287 (2003) 
(citing Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 156 (O’Conner, J., concurring in the judgment)) (explaining 
the shifting and weak nature of political identification as compared to race). 
92 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). 
93 Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 124. 
94 Id. at 150 (O’Conner, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[B]ut it is an altogether dif-
ferent matter to conclude that political groups themselves have an independent 
constitutional claim to representation.  And the Court’s decisions hold squarely that they do 
not.” (quoting City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 78-79 (1980) (plurality opinion))). 
95 See supra note 5. 
96 SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY, 886 (Foundation Press rev. 2d ed. 
2002). 
97 Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004). 
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redistricting schemes coupled with discriminatory effect against minorities 
is judicially measurable.98 Not so with discriminatory intent and effect 
against a person based on political party identification in the course of 
legislative districting.  Only four justices agreed that partisan gerrymander-
ing was totally nonjusticiable in Vieth, so the issue was not entirely resolved 
and left open the possibility of it being revisited once again.99 Indeed, 
lawsuits would continue to be filed claiming discrimination by partisan 
redistricting plans, leading up to the litigation revolving Texas’s mid-
decade redistricting in 2003. 
 
VI. THE TEXAS REDISTRICTING CASES 
A.  Facts 
 
The circumstances of this case began with the reapportionment after 
the 1990 census.  Since Reconstruction, Texas was dominated by the 
Democrat Party, but beginning in the late 1980s, the Republican Party 
began making a significant resurgence.100 After the 1990 census, Texas was 
awarded three additional seats in the U.S. House of Representatives while 
the Democrat party controlled both houses of its state legislature and its 
governorship.101 The redistricting plan that came out of the homogenic 
structure was heavily favorable for congressional Democrats and was 
described by nonpartisan political pundits as, “the shrewdest gerrymander 
of the 1990s.”102 Lawsuits were filed against the plan, but the 1992 elec-
tions were held under the its districts resulting in 21 Democrats to 9 
Republicans winning, but Democrats garnering only a 49.9% plurality of 
the statewide vote.103 Throughout the 1990s, the Republican’s statewide 
vote percentage continued to grow up to and beyond the 50% mark, but a 
majority of the State’s representatives in Congress remained Democrats.104 
By the time the 2000 census was completed, Texas’s population had 
grown enough so that it was awarded two additional congressional seats.  
The Texas legislature that would control this reapportionment was compiled 
of a Republican majority in the state senate, but a Democrat majority in the 
 
98 Id. at 293. 
99 Id. at 317 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
100 Brief of State Appellees at 1, League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry 
(The Texas Redistricting Cases), No. 05-2604 (2006). 
101 MICHAEL BARONE & GRANT UJIFUSA, THE ALMANAC OF AMERICAN POLITICS 2000, 
at 1515 (National Journal 1999). 
102 Id. 
103 Brief of State, supra note 100, at 2. 
104 BARONE & UJIFUSA, THE ALMANAC OF AMERICAN POLITICS 2000, at 1515. 
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state house of representatives.105 The state legislature deadlocked in the 
process, and a three-judge federal panel was needed to construct the map.  
The court took a minimalist approach to not disturb the previous map and to 
protect incumbents, and the result was essentially a perpetuation of the 1991 
Democrat gerrymander.106 The 2002 election resulted in Republicans 
receiving 53% of the statewide vote for congressional elections, but Democ-
rats winning 17 of the 32 seats.107 
Under much controversy, the 78th Texas Legislature – composed of 
a Republican majority in both houses – passed a new congressional redis-
tricting plan.  It took two special sessions to be called by Governor Rick 
Perry (R) – while Democrat legislators fled the state – in order to pass Plan 
1374C.108 Hardly any one involved in the process hesitated to admit that 
the plan was intended to create a map where Republicans would compose a 
majority of Texas’s congressional delegation.109 The result was an election 
in 2004 where Republicans won 21 of the 32 seats and obtained 58% of the 
vote in statewide races.110 Before the 2004 election, but soon after Plan 
1374C’s passage, appellants and other plaintiffs filed suit to have the map 
of 2001 reinstated.111 
B.  Holding112 
In a decision written by Justice Kennedy, the Court essentially held 
that partisan gerrymandering claims are not a political question, and those 
claims are justiciable.  His reasoning was founded on Justice White’s 
reasoning in Bandemer, which in turn was founded on White’s assumptions 
in Gaffney. In regards to justiciability, Kennedy was explicitly joined by 
Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, and joined as to the disposi-
tion of the case by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito.  The latter two 
claimed that neither the appellants nor appellees had raised the issue; 
therefore they took no position on it.  Justice Stevens, joined by Justice 
Breyer, wrote that the issue was justiciable, but did so in a separate opinion 
 
105 MICHAEL BARONE & RICHARD E. COHEN, THE ALMANAC OF AMERICAN POLITICS 
2006, at 1575 (National Journal 2006). 
106 Id. 
107 Id. 
108 Brief of State, supra note 100, at 8-9. 
109 Indeed, then-Majority Leader Tom DeLay, who was widely credited with orches-
trating the 2003 redistricting, was quoted as saying, “I’m the majority leader, and I want 
more seats.”  Lee Hockstader, A Texas-Sized Brawl Over Redistricting, WASH. POST, May 
17, 2003, at A3. 
110 BARONE & COHEN, THE ALMANAC OF AMERICAN POLITICS 2006, at 1576. 
111 Brief of State, supra note 100, at 12. 
112 The Texas Redistricting Cases, 126 S. Ct. 2594 (2006). 
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with his own reasoning.  Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, dissented 
to all aspects of the case, including the justiciability issue. 
 Once a majority of the Court found that partisan gerrymandering 
was justiciable, the confusion continued, but the result was a holding that 
the 2003 Texas redistricting plan was not a violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause.  Justices Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, Alito, and Chief Justice 
Roberts agreed on this decision, while Justices Scalia and Thomas did not 
address it (since they argued the issue was nonjusticiable).  Justices Stevens 
and Breyer dissented to this and argued that the plan was partially, if not 
entirely, a violation of the equal protection rights of Texas Democrats.  The 
multiple opinions then went on to address alleged violations of the Voting 
Rights Act by the plan with a majority holding that the 23rd District was 
illegal. The result is Texas being partially redistricted to cure this Voting 
Rights Act violation.113 
C.  Critical Analysis of the Court’s Reasoning 
 
1. A Disingenuous Approach to the Underlying Issue 
 
Justice Kennedy in writing his plurality opinion in The Texas Redis-
tricting Cases assumes justiciability of the issue of political gerrymandering 
cases.  He fails to state exactly why these types of cases are justiciable, and 
no Baker test is done to determine if any of its six elements are present.114 
The opinion does investigate whether a reliable standard for adjudicating 
equal protection claims is offered by appellants, and concludes that one is 
not.  The fact that the Texas plan in question was enacted mid-decade does 
not offend the Fourteenth Amendment’s prohibition against discrimination 
or its one-person, one-vote requirement.115 
Although this is a correct conclusion, it is an incorrect method, and 
only extends the assumptions of Gaffney and Bandemer. Before concluding 
that the appellants “state no claim on which relief may be granted,” the 
Court should have first determined if this issue is justiciable and if the 
Constitution gives it authority to interject itself into such political issues.116 
Furthermore, the Court makes no distinction as to state legislative 
districting plans and congressional districting plans.117 Although most are 
 
113 Since the Voting Rights Act is a congressional invitation for judicial supervision of 
redistricting plans, and the Fifteenth Amendment permits judicial review in racial gerry-
mandering cases, this note concedes in arguendo that this aspect of the case was correctly 
decided. 
114 The Texas Redistricting Cases, 126 S. Ct. at 2607. 
115 Id. at 2609-12. 
116 Id. at 2612. 
117 This Note claims both are nonjusticiable political questions, but acknowledges a 
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developed at the same time, the Constitution dictates directly to the latter in 
terms of giving state legislatures and Congress sole authority in regulating 
congressional elections.  Bandemer, which first established justiciability of 
political gerrymandering cases, was a challenge to a state legislative plan 
and not a congressional plan.118 Vieth’s plurality addressed a congressional 
districting plan, but held the entire scope of partisan gerrymandering claims 
as nonjusticiable.119 Therefore, when the Court adjudicated the equal 
protection claims in the Texas Redistricting Cases, it was its first decision 
directly inserting itself into Congress’s authority to self-regulate partisan 
gerrymandering, and the Court did so without recognizing the momentous 
step it was taking.  The Elections Clause and Colegrove v. Green, which 
held congressional districting challenges as nonjusticiable, were ignored. 
 
2. An Inability to Formulate a Measurable Standard of Unfairness 
 
One of the Baker elements that must be present to establish justicia-
bility is for the presence of a judicially manageable and discernible standard 
of adjudication.120 Since Bandemer, and in The Texas Redistricting Cases,
the Court has been unable to articulate a standard or find agreement 
amongst the justices to any of the many proposed standards.  This inability 
to agree or discern a standard demonstrates partisan gerrymandering’s 
nonjusticiability. 
 In Bandemer, the Court first attempted to articulate a standard for 
adjudicating such claims that was modeled off the racial gerrymandering 
standard.121 This was an intent and effects test, but its difficulty in applica-
tion was a result of the dissimilarities between race and party identification.  
Fourteen years later, when the Court nearly reversed itself in Vieth, its 
dissents were still unable to articulate a single, discernible standard to 
adjudicate these claims.122 Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer each 
formulated standards, but all failed in determining when politics in district-
ing is actually too much politics.  In The Texas Redistricting Cases, the 
Court’s opinion states that a presumption to invalidate mid-decade redis-
tricting is improper, and after examining two other proffered standards, 
rebukes each of them as unworkable or overly constraining.123 The result is 
 
distinction between the two based on the Elections Clause, which makes claims against 
congressional districting plans more nonjusticiable. 
118 Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986). 
119 Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004). 
120 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). 
121 Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 127-43. 
122 Vieth, 541 U.S. at 317-68. 
123 The Texas Redistricting Cases, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2609-11 (2006) (holding that both 
a “sole-intent” standard and a “symmetry” standard are unreliable). 
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more standards discussed, but a consistent inability for agreement on how to 
resolve such claims as required by Baker v. Carr.
The one-person, one-vote rule as articulated in Gray v. Sanders was 
announced soon after Baker and is characterized by its ease of applica-
tion.124 The Court has had 20 years since Bandemer to articulate a standard 
for partisan gerrymandering claims, and after contemplating at least five, 
none have been found effective.  In addition, racial gerrymandering is a 
simple matter to adjudicate, especially because of race’s status as a suspect 
class.  Political identification is not such a class, but rather a fluid concept 
amongst voters, which has proven immeasurable in regards to unconstitu-
tional discrimination.  Furthermore, Congress has provided base standards 
to measure illegal racial gerrymandering in the Voting Rights Act,125 but 
not so with partisan gerrymandering. 
 
3. A Rejection of the Elections Clause’s Default Position 
 
Within The Texas Redistricting Cases there is little mention of the 
Elections Clause or its jurisprudence and history in American law.  Because 
the Court in essence ignores this provision and its importance in congres-
sional redistricting, it takes no deference to congressional acts or the 
decisions of state legislatures.  Justice Kennedy mentions the clause in his 
preliminary discussion of the relation of the branches of government in 
regards to apportionment, but does not recognize that the Constitution has 
provided exceptions to the Elections Clause to allow courts to regulate only 
racial gerrymandering.126 Doing so, he rejects the remaining default 
position of the Elections Clause and ignores the “textually demonstrable 
constitutional commitment” of this issue to Congress.127 
The opinion’s rejection of the default position of the Elections 
Clause also fails to realize that judicial intervention is unneeded for a 
variety of reasons.  First, politics is circular as paradigms shift, and the 
democratic process is able to correct any extreme partisan gerrymandering 
plans over time.128 Second, for partisan gerrymandering to be effective, it 
must make elections in districts closer by the packing and cracking process.  
The more these procedures occur, the closer elections become, and the more 
likely the gerrymandering plan will fail.  This makes political gerrymander-
ing a self-limiting procedure.129 Also, if citizens are disgruntled by extreme 
 
124 372 U.S. 368 (1963). 
125 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2000). 
126 The Texas Redistricting Cases, 126 S. Ct. at 2608. 
127 Baker v. Carr 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). 
128 See supra Part I.A. 
129 See Davis v. Bandemer 478 U.S. 109, 152 (1986) (O’Conner, J., concurring in the 
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gerrymandering practices of legislators (or the beneficiaries of these plans, 
i.e. U.S. Representatives) an anti-incumbency mood can influence the 
electorate, and these politicians will be defeated in the next elections.  In 
American democracy, voters tend to vote for individuals and not party 
representation; therefore in most regions incumbents are never perfectly 
safe simply because of their party identification, and in other regions one 
party is highly predominant at all levels of government because of the 
behavior and choice of that electorate.130 Furthermore, governors in most 
states possess veto power of redistricting legislation,131 so if the controlling 
party in the legislature that is attempting to gerrymander in its favor is 
actually the state’s minority party, then the governor will likely be in the 
majority party and can veto an extreme plan.  All of these reasons demon-
strate that it is systematic of a democracy to correct extreme partisan 
gerrymandering, and judicial action is unnecessary.132 
By ignoring the default position of the Elections Clause, the Court 
demonstrates a lack of faith in the democratic process and interjects the 
least democratic branch of government into what is truly a political ques-
tion.  This is in essence “expressing lack of the respect due” to Congress as 
the ultimate authority under the Constitution to regulate the elections in 
which its members are chosen.133 
VII. CONCLUSION 
While the holding of The Texas Redistricting Cases was correct, the 
opinion produced no clear guidance for future cases.  The Court should 
have held that political gerrymandering cases are nonjusticiable political 
questions. 
 
A.  The Effects on State Legislatures and Possible Solutions 
 
Because of the decision in The Texas Redistricting Cases, state leg-
islatures face two seemingly contradictory effects.  First, since the Court 
 
judgment) (explaining the electoral risks involved in political gerrymandering and the 
potential for “disaster” in an “overambitious” plan). 
130 JERROLD G. RUSK, A STATISTICAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN ELECTORATE 510-
515 (CQ Press 2001).  See generally id. at tbl.8.6 (demonstrating the evolving patterns of 
party identification in some regions over time and entrenched party identification in other 
regions). 
131 NAT’L COUNCIL OF STATE LEGISLATURES, STATE REDISTRICTING PROFILES 2000, at 
ix (1999). 
132 GRIFFITH, supra note 15, at 123 (“Public sentiment does much to defeat the end 
attempted by the gerrymander.”). 
133 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). 
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implicitly ruled that such cases are justiciable, it is likely that nearly all of 
their districting plans – whether decennially or mid-decade – will be chal-
lenged in courts.  The Voting Rights Act causes litigation as well, but it is 
congressionally mandated supervision and courts have a clearer standard for 
resolving such issues.134 No clear standard can be formulated by the Court 
to resolve partisan motivated gerrymandering, but this inability will not 
prevent lawsuits.  Second, the Court’s inability to articulate a standard will 
cause lower courts difficulty in adjudicating such claim.  But, because 
egregious partisan gerrymandering was held constitutional in Bandemer,
Vieth, and The Texas Redistricting Cases, lower courts will likely dismiss 
future lawsuits.  This likelihood will not prevent suits from being filed as a 
proper holding in The Texas Redistricting Cases would have accomplished. 
 To aid state legislatures in preventing judicial scrutiny of their dis-
tricting plans, they should utilize one or more of the variety of options at 
their disposal.  The most drastic choice is all encompassing and would cure 
the process of any partisanship; that is to remove the process from the 
legislature.  A variety of states have established commissions to handle the 
entire process that are composed of members of both parties and usually 
independents.135 These commissions act similarly to the three-judge panels 
used in federal court, but state legislatures, or citizens through ballot 
initiatives, have approved the process, creating self-denial of partisanship.  
Redistricting commissions are likely a popular method of foreclosing 
judicial activity, and it is an example of democracy’s recursiveness limiting 
an alleged flaw. 
 A less drastic, but also a less certain way to prevent adjudication of 
political gerrymandering cases is for state legislatures to impose require-
ments of the districts they create.136 Challenges could still be brought under 
the Fourteenth and the Fifteenth Amendments in federal court, but require-
ments such as contiguity and compactness would lessen partisan effects of 
districting plans.  Predetermined and specific criteria for districts would 
make adjudicating cases simpler and easier to dismiss.  Self-imposing 
districting criteria would provide a more democratic resolution to the 
supposed problem, as compared to unrestrained judicial intervention. 
 
B.   Ways for Congress to Foreclose Judicial Action on Gerrymandering 
Cases 
 
134 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2000). 
135 NAT’L COUNCIL OF STATE LEGISLATURES, REDISTRICTING LAW 2000, at 137-38, 
143-45 (2000). 
136 See id. at 146-89 (describing each state’s principles that are legally required in their 
redistricting plans). 
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 Like state legislatures, Congress can take actions that will 
prevent courts from adjudicating political gerrymandering claims.  It could 
take actions similar to those described supra by legislatures to reduce the 
amount of partisanship in the process.  The Elections Clause makes Con-
gress supreme on such matters, so mandating plans be drafted and approved 
by a commission is certainly an available option, which would have the 
same effect and benefits as if state legislatures had done so themselves. 137 
Creating standards, unless done precisely and finitely, would 
not reduce federal court intervention or litigation.  A vague standard such as 
“compact and contiguous” is not sufficiently finite, and such definitions 
would have to be determined through judicial interpretation.  To reduce this 
effect, a definite permissible “gerrymandering quotient” should be estab-
lished, thus making judicial enforcement simple and efficient.138 
A more succinct way for Congress to preclude court action 
on partisan gerrymandering claims is to attempt to remove federal court 
jurisdiction.  If allowed, a law preventing lower courts from hearing claims 
based on a constitutional challenge to partisan gerrymandering districts 
would also decide the issue of justiciability by democratic means.  Congress 
would be acting under its constitutional authority to “ordain and establish” 
lower courts and make exceptions and regulations to Supreme Court 
appellate jurisdiction.139 It is possible that the Supreme Court would rule 
such a law to restrict jurisdiction of political gerrymandering cases is also 
unconstitutional, but Congress should nevertheless attempt such an ac-
tion.140 
C.  A Way for Lower Courts to Dismiss Gerrymandering Cases 
 
Without a clear standard for determining the constitutionality of dis-
tricting plans that contain partisan intent and effects, lower courts are placed 
in the same scenario as they were during the “post-Bandemer/pre-Vieth 
era.”141 Therefore, lower courts should dismiss all cases brought on this 
 
137 See, e.g., Fairness and Independence in Redistricting Act of 2006, S. 2350, 109th 
Cong. (2006); Redistricting Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 4094, 109th Cong. (2005); Voter 
Choice Act of 2005, H.R. 2690 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 830, 109th Cong. (2005). 
138 See generally supra text accompanying note 3. 
139 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. 
140 Compare United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128 (1871) (holding act of Congress re-
moving appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court a violation of the separation-of-powers 
doctrine) with Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506 (1868) (holding Congress has the ability to 
remove Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction of cases) and Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651 
(1996) (holding Congress can make exceptions to Supreme Court jurisdiction). 
141 See generally Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 281 (2004) (describing the error in 
Bandemer’s faith in the possibility of a judicial standard for political gerrymandering 
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issue as a result of The Texas Redistricting Cases’ inability to formulate a 
clear standard.  By simply explaining that no standard has been articulated 
and that no partisan redistricting plan has ever been held unconstitutional, 
lower courts should refuse to adjudicate any further political gerrymander-
ing claims. 142 It would be inefficient and incorrect to do otherwise. 
 The only benefit to The Texas Redistricting Cases’ holding is its 
demonstration that egregiousness partisanship in gerrymandering is likely 
constitutional.  After the redistricting plans in Texas and Pennsylvania, it is 
hard to imagine an instance of political gerrymandering that can surpass the 
intent and effects of these schemes, especially since even racial gerryman-
dering plans have rarely been struck on purely constitutional grounds.143 
Regardless, the Supreme Court wasted a valuable opportunity to resolve this 
important issue and remove itself from an ever-present practice of American 
politics.  Instead it has left the question unanswered and left open the 
possibility for judges to shape congressional membership, allowing the 
judiciary to supplant the text and intent of the Elections Clause.144 
claims being formulated in the future). 
142 Cf. Badham v. Eu, 694 F. Supp. 664 (N.D. Cal) (dismissing complaint for failure to 
state a claim for a constitutional challenge to a partisan gerrymander), appeal dismissed,
488 U.S. 804, reh’g granted, 488 U.S. 953 (1988), aff’d, 488 U.S. 1024 (1989). 
143 See, e.g., Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971) (holding a multi-member dis-
tricting plan that was allegedly discriminatory was not a violation of the equal protection 
clause simply because racial minorities were outvoted in a district).  But see, e.g., White v. 
Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973) (holding a multi-member districting plan coupled with 
historical discriminatory practices was a violation of the equal protection clause because 
the state actions invidiously excluded racial minorities from the electoral process). 
144 Cf. Colegrove v. Green 328 U.S. 549, 553-54 (1946) (“It is hostile to a democratic 
system to involve the judiciary in the politics of the people.  And it is not less pernicious if 
such judicial intervention in an essentially political contest be dressed up in the abstract 
phrases of the law.”) (opinion by Frankfurter, J.). 
